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1N ltiL :-,1wHUIF: COllRT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
1 f--'. ' 11 I ti ..,, i l)f( 
Case No. 19050 
Jl J t'. LLE NAYLOR, 
Oefenda nt-Respondent. 
- - -ex>oO ex>o- - -
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce action in which the plaintiff husband 
H.µpeals frum thP granting of his former wife's petition to increase and 
enntmuP alimony and to increase child support. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Following a day-long trrnl, the Honorable Scott Daniels 
111c·neasPd thr> ;ippellant's alimony obligation by $100 to $600 per month, 
"' uu·1'd that al!Tnony be continued for an additional five-year period, 
Hnd 1n.·r•'H'··1l r:hJd support by $150 to $400 per month. (Tr. at 75, R. 
. .., II 
• 1·11 fmdi.1gs of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. at 129-32) 
'"'"! •lrkr IR ;it 140-421 were entered by the District 
1·111 r. • ,,, .i ion tiled by appellant (R. at 121-23) was denied 
: l' ii t l 1:l 44). 
Detendant "·l'" 1 "' NHylur respPctfully requests 
that this Court affirm if, 11, --;,[l.;•t, 11,. t1rd1·r ot the District Court 
and award to her tt1e arlrlitwnaJ 0 oui1se! (Pc>S she has incurred as a 
result of this appeai. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 9, lq78, the' Honorable David K. Winder, then judge 
of the District Court 111 Salt Lake County, entered a Decree of Divorce 
terminating the eleven and one-half year marriage between the parties. 
(R. at 43-46.) tlif>t marriage, plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter 
"Dr. Naylor") attended medical school, obtained his doctor's degree, 
completed his residency and internship, and became a practicing 
(Tr. at li, R. at 160A.) The original Decree provided for 
alimony io defendar:1 respondent (hereinafter "Mrs. Naylor") of $500 per 
month tor a period of five years (Decree 13, R. at 44) and awarded child 
support in the amount of $250 a month for Dr. Naylor's son, who was 
placed in the custody of Mrs. Naylor (_!_<:!.). 
At the time of the original Decree, Dr. Naylor had just begun 
practicing medicir1e and was determined hy Judge Winder to be earning 
$2,600 per month. <Findings '115, R. at 3o.J Naylor, on the other 
hand, was a hair stylist and was tound t:; have net earnings of $702 per 
month at the time of the original Ile<'rte 11<1 ) Both parties contem-
plated at that tim<c that ,\lr"s llH ,,, .r-'o "" ., ., w"uld substantially 
l r1 (' t H '""){) J f "' ·1 v.uuld not be necessary beyond the initial five 
's tt1e 0ri!'."'&I DPf'ree. (Findings tl(b), R. at 130; 
'.1"1 '1:1( 'J;i (1 -
1''""""''"1p1.' Mrs. Naylor's income did not increase as 
ant1c11.rnten l' was ""r unrefuted testimony at trial that her actual 
Pll' '"nt jr,.:omG W!iS only $720 per month before taxes (Tr. at 7, R. at 
1;,·, &nd Exhibit D-2) as compared with a net income of $702 per month at 
the time of thC' r1riginal Decree (Findings 15, R. at 35). Moreover, 
i11llation, combined v.ith the fact that the parties' son has now reached 
tus teens has resulted in a substantial increase in monthly household 
expenses tor Naylor. It was her unrefuted testimony that her 
C'urren t monthly expenses were in excess of $2, 000 per month. (Tr. at 8, 
R. at 158 Hnd Exhibit D-1.) Thus, at the time of the modification hear-
•.!rs. Naylor faced a substantial monthly deficiency between her 
BVBLlable income and her expenses, which had resulted in her having had 
to bor-row more than $13,000 from her parents by the time of trial. (Tr. 
at Y. R. at 159. l 
Pr, tne other hand, Dr. Naylor has enjoyed a dramatic increase 
'" WC'•cme sm'-e the original Decree. He has become a "partner" (techni-
ui!l v s 1 in his professional corporation (Tr. at 50, R. at 
1 ,,,, _, >lT•rl re, ivc.o a base pay of $5, 000 per month (Tr. at 36, R. at 185). 
"' NAvl1" "'" substantial annual bonuses from his profes-
'" ,,,,-r, to at least $24, 000 in 1980 and at 
'" 1 1 -\r'I' Hr. at 4.) Contrary to the assertion in 
his Brief (App. Br. at 4). Dr. Naylor rcpeatPdly testified at the 
modification hearing that l-te ari11. 11\cil<:! i i1A1 his 1982 bonus would be 
comparable with those h1c- trnri r.-c<ei" -" ,,, P'lrilPr yP.ars (Tr. at 37 and 
67, R. at 186 and 216). Jn adcil\10,-- u-, taxable income, which was 
$75,000 in 1979, $84,000 in 1980 and $83,SOO m 1981 (Tr. at 59, R. at 
208), Dr. Naylor receives substantial tax tree pension and profit 
sharing contributions (Tr. at 71, R. at 220). These contributions are 
made by the professional corporation, 'lre not deducted from his salary, 
and total approximately 25 percent of that salary. (Tr. at 71. R. at 
220.) Thus, Dr. Naylor's total income at the present time, considering 
his base salary, his b0m1ses, his pension contributions and his profit 
sharing contributions, are approximately $100, 000 per year, a dramatic 
increase over the $2, 600 per month found by Judge Winder at the time of 
the orig1nr,_\ Decree. 
J•,Jd ge Daniels fourid that Dr. N aylor's substantial increase 
in income as well as the increased living expenses encountered by 
Mrs. Naylor constituted a change of circumstances necessitating 
modification of the original Decree's alimony and child support 
provisions. (Tr. at 76, R. at 225 and Findings 'H, R. 130-31.) Then, 
based upon the need der.ionstraled by Mrs. Naylor and Dr. Naylor's 
demonstrated earnings capability, Judge Daniels ordered that alimony be 
increased from $500 per month to $fi00 per month and continued for an 
additior1al five years and that child support be mcreased from $250 to 
$41111 i'"r · 1or1lt· · '· '""''e·: .. R. 131-32.) Additionally, based upon 
r·J· ... vl 1 l1'::--- t '- 1 -l11'•r1"' her financial circumstances were such that 
· 1· tu pay her own attor·ney's fees Tr. at 12, R. at 
''" • "' '•1c1r1c1 f'()•l1'i ordered Dr., Naylor to pay $1,000 towards those 
rces U, H "l t411. Dr. Naylor's Rule 60(b) motion having been 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE ALIMONY PROVISIONS OP THE ORIGINAL 
DECREE REMAINED SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION. 
The principal argument raised by appellant is that, since the 
rw1ginal Decree provided alimony for a specific number of years, the 
D1stnct Court exceeded its power in modifying the alimony provisions of 
that ne ... ree ever· if a substantial change in relevant circumstances had 
occ:urred. This argument that the alimony provisions of the original 
Decree (being phrased in terms of a specific number of years) were 
fllJsol 11te and immutable is directly contrary to both statutory mandate 
and tlw riedsions of this Court. 
The Legislature has clearly given the district courts the 
pnw('r and resnonsibtlity to make such subsequent modification in any 
llecre.• r<'i<nrdlt>ss of its original terms, as may be appropriate and 
S.:1:,., .. Jll·1 5, l'tah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), 
The court -.;,• ! i I 
make sueh ()f" •H w nrrlcrs with 
respect to 
parties. the 
support and 
the property 
the RlHf mH1nl,.·n11nce of the 
cu1:1 -1y if)t iht> r>htldrPn and their 
r.r thP distribution of 
as shttJt 1"1e rt=-a:;cJilHbJ\ anrl necessary. 
In light of the clear mandate ul i.tns the contention of 
appellant that the District Court lacked the power and jurisdiction to 
moJ1fy his alimony obligation is unienable. 
The contentior1 of Dr. Naylor that his alimony obligation is 
not modifiable because it was based upon a stipulated property 
settlement was con:;1dered <J.nd unequivocally rejected by this Court in 
Callister v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P. 2d 944 (1953). In that 
case, the husband was a physician who reached a stipulated property 
with his wife in connection with their divorce. This 
agreer1l<2nt, which hHCi b·'CEL approved by the trial court in the original 
action, included the dislr1but10n of the parties' property and provided 
for fixed monthly payments. Following the entry of the original decree, 
the hu5band's health forced hirn to terminate much of his medical 
practice and he moved for modification of the decree so as to reduce his 
monthly obligation. ThP district court granted this motion and, on 
appeal, the wife contended that the 'Jrigir1al decree "requiring monthly 
payments [was] not subject to morl1ficat1nr1 !since] it was based upon an 
agreement for property settlement and thHI lh• [JHyments required [did] 
not fall within the accepted clPf:nn ,, ,-, ,; q111,1i\ ••• " 261 P. 2d at 
945-46. Thus, the issue µr"SPYl1<-"I "'" r,,·,·c1si>\v t11<: content10n raised 
11• 1f., 1.c ·c·:P"I ac1ion. In language as applicable to the 
! I < - 80 the thET1 before it, this Court held that the 
was modifiable upon the demonstration of a 
,,.-,, c:c.•1ng" c.t circumstances, even though based upon a stipulated 
There is no statement anywhere in the agreement 
thttt the monthly payments constituted payment for 
[the husband's] interest in property decreed to 
[the w1Je J. • • • We further hold that these 
[mom hl y payment l provisions are not an inseparable 
part of the agreement relating to division of 
property and thet by approval of the agreement in 
1 he decree the court did not divest itself of 
Jurisdiction under the statute to make such sub-
sequent changes and orders with respect to alimony 
payments as might be reasonable and proper, based 
i;pon change of circumstances. We hold this to be 
true_ even though the provisions of the agreement 
be interpreted to mean that the parties 
intended to stipulate for a fixed and unalterable 
am<_:lunt __ of monthly alimon¥. The object and purpose 
Of the statute is to give the courts power to 
enforce, after divorce, the duty of support which 
exists between a husband and wife or parent and 
child. Legislators who enacted the law were 
1-wobably aware of a fact, which is a matter of 
common knowledge to trial courts, that parties to 
d1vorC'e suits frequently enter into agreements 
relative to alimony or for child support which, if 
hmding upon lhe courts, would leave children or 
divm·cttJ wifes inadequately provided for. It is 
ttiPrefo.re reasonable to assume that the law was 
rnlendeci lo give courts power to disregard the 
st1r .. tJttt1011s or agreements of the parties in the 
1·1r·.1 1,-.<:tanre and enter judgment for such alimony 
'" •:h•id s,1pport as appears reasonable, and to 
[t,..,, ... ,,_.c ,,,..cjifv such agreements when changeot' 
'· 1 .. ,,, .• -•. justifies it, regardless of attempts 
.i 11" r the matter by contract. 
1: i r 11( dtJi :1urHies herein cited such a view 
r:· ,,,., ''!! ,. t1 not universally adhered to 
by the i;ourt:,;. l i ll twld .,1 twrwise in this 
case in which a tiush>1rid ,,.q.:, for H reduction of 
it would prf'ce<1e11t which in 
future cases m;ghl p1°event divorced wives in 
serious distress from obtH1mng increased alimony 
from ex-husbands possessed of wealth or ample 
income to provide for them. We hold that the trial 
court had power and jurisdiction to modify the 
decree of divorce with respect to the payments 
involved herein. 
261 P. 2d at 948-49 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the District Court 
had the power and jurisdiction to modify Dr. Naylor's alimony obligation 
in this case. 
This issue was again before this Court in Mitchell v. 
Mitchell, 527 P. 2d 1359 (Utah 1974). In that case, the wife petitioned 
the trial court to modify the alimony and child support payments based 
upo11 former husband's 50 percent increase in earnings and an 
inflationary increase in che cost of living. The trial court concluded 
that these factors constituted a substantial change of circumstances 
that justified an increase in both alimony and child support. On 
appeal, the husband contended "that in the original decree [the wife] 
was awarded the family home in lieu of substantial alimony payments, and 
such a property settlement should be deemed res judicata and held to 
preclude any subsequent modification of alimony." 527 P.2d at 1360. 
After referring to and quoting Se<:'t1on 10 3- 5, this Court held: 
In accordance with tf1is ofatute, this court 
has held thHt a pr Le "'"difv a divorce 
decree is Pqu1table B"d · h" same authority is 
conferred upon thP r11Ftl """lit to 111HkP subsequent 
changes as respPC'I to :rnpport and mttintern1nce as it 
• c,u!d ., ·.< .. Hlt with them originally. • • • [l]n 
·J1•1rircl' H• t1or1, the trial court has considerable 
,41it1_,de «I d"cretion in adjusting financial and 
"'':"''''t\. "''"'·esls, and its actions are indulged 
with A pH"8un1ption of validity. The burden is upon 
•n prove that the evidence clearly 
against the findings as made; or that 
tr,c-r? wHs a misunderstanding or misapplication of 
ttic lsw .resultmg in substantial and prejudicial 
'"r-r0r vr a serious inequity has resulted as to 
manifest a clear abuse of discretion. 
527 P. 2d at 1360 (footnote citations omitted). In the present case, the 
evidence presented at the trial clearly supports the trial court's 
findings of fact; Dr. Naylor does not claim that inequity has resulted; 
and lhe OIBtrict Court's determination that the alimony obligation was 
modifiable 1s consistent with firmly established Utah law. 
From as early as 1916, in Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 Pac. 
rn1 (l!Hb!, to as recently as 1981, in Georgedes v. Georgedes, 627 P.2d 
44 il'tah 1981), this Court has consistently recognized and adhered to 
thE precept that both alimony and property distributions remain 
n1od1f19ble upon the showing of a substantial change of circumstances 
of whether the original award was stipulated or litigated. 
contC!llion of Dr. Naylor that the District Court lacked the power or 
J·1r1s<11ct1on lo modity his alimony obligation is without merit. 
H•!NT II. MODIFICATION OF THE ALIMONY AND SUPPORT 
''""'"l•un is mad!o by Pr. Naylor in his brief that, even 
",.; r IH• Jurisdiction to modify his support 
9 
obligations, modification wlis not liJ•i' »'" ·"' in this case. He bases 
this contention upon factual i t !101 are contrary to both the 
evidence adduced at the ln!il arid thP firn1rngs of fact entered by the 
trial court. 
For example, Dr. Naylor contends (App. Br. at 10) that "his 
net pay per month is increased to only $3, 170, a rather small increase" 
over the $2, 600 per month at the time of the original decree. In 
reality, however, the Dist.rict Court found that Or. Naylor's "gross 
annual income is $83, 000 and based upon his 1981 tax return his net 
after-tax income is $75,000 a year." (Findings '11Ca), R. at 130.) 
These findings are consistent with Dr. Naylor's own testimony. (Tr. at 
59, R. ;,.1. ;;•iA.) The $3,170 figure mentioned in Dr. Naylor's brief is 
presuMably based upon his $5, 000 per month base pay less state and 
federal rnx withholding. However, the statement is grossly misleading 
because his brief fails to mention that for 1981, Dr. Naylor received 
tax refunds totalling $26,902.47. (See, Exhibit D-5.) Similarly, 
Dr. Naylor's tax refunds for 1980 totalled almost $20,000. (See, 
Exhibit 0-4.) Thus, wher1 Dr. Naylor's .after tax income is considered 
(found by the District rourt lo be $75,000 a year), Dr. Naylor's net 
income has actually more !hetn douhle<1 from $2, 600 per month at 
the time of the original dec>ree to more $h. fJOO at the time of the 
modification hearing. MoreovPr w ,,,.,., 1 1., t"'ns10n and profit sharing 
contributions made on Tlr. Naylor's t.,,lwl! Hr>e also considered, his 
!() 
'"' """' ''"'' m .. 1 ,, than tr1 1.1, .1 si11ce the original decree was entered. 
_;,=!t ·,• ··){(1181 in circumstances. 
,,.,11/ it .. , District Court found that the increase in 
Nay ivr's i;" · irne. "'h1ch the parties had anticipated at the time of 
original Jpcree, had not come to fruition. In fact, while her after 
t011 rneume at the time of t.he original decree had been $702 per month, 
r1er current income at the time of the modification hearing was only $720 
per month befo•e taxes. (Findings U(b), R. at 130.) Moreover, infla-
tiun together with the fact that Dr. Naylor's son has now entered his 
teen-age years, has substantially increased Mrs. Naylor's expenses, 
which were approximately $2,180 per month at the time of the modifica-
tlon hearing. (Findings at lll(c), R. at 130-31.) 
These precise factors (husband's increased income coupled with 
mcreascd livmg expenses due to inflation) were held by this Court to 
Justify modificat10n of alimony and child support obligations in Wiker 
,, , Wiker, 600 P.2d 514 (Utah 1978). In that case, this Court held: 
-·-------
li nder present inflationary trends and lapse of time 
in between awards, the continued illness of [the 
wuE') together with the fact that [the husband's] 
salarv has greatly increased, we cannot say the 
coL'rt abused its discretion. 
lillil I' ''1 al i 5. Likewise. the District Court did not abuse its 
,11·· '"' iPn '" .1-,.. presPnt case in modifying the alimony and support 
'"" :·- Nn·ilut· ""view of the fact that his income has 
•11 "' ,,.,._,,,, 111<-' lacr that inf1at1on and the age of his son 
11 
have increased the month!v c"xpPP'c"'' ", "' rPd by Mrs. Naylor, and the 
fact that the anticipa1ed increase m her toicnme has not materialized. 
POINT III. THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDED ARE APPROPRIATI 
BUT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN ADDITIONAL AWARD REPRESENTH 
THE FEES INCURRED IN THIS APPEAL. 
The District Court found that Mrs. Naylor was "without funds 
with which to pay her attorney" (Findings '!!3, R. at 131) and entered 
judgment against Dr. Naylor in the amount of $1,000 as his contribution 
to those fees. (Order 'i13, R. at 141-42.) The finding of the District 
Court was based upon the unrefuted testimony of Mrs. Naylor. (Tr. at 
12, R IH 161.) 
'" circumstances where one litigant in a domestic proceeding 
lacks the financial wherewithal! to pay counsel, this Court has 
repeatedly held that an award of attorney's fees is appropriate. For 
example, in Alldredge v. Alldredge, 119 Utah 504, 229 P.2d 681 (1951), 
it was pointed out that this Court had traditionally adhered to the 
policy that: 
The awarding of counsel fees as well as alimony was 
in the discretion of the trial court, and that a 
finding of the trial court would not be set aside 
in the absence of an abuse of such discretion. 
It was error for the "<lUrt tr, ,i, ny th!' (wife] 
counsel fees whict1 artc prnl u• "er costs pendente 
]') 
l!tP ''"''' '""'"ld have been required before the 
I cu•li.1111lcf1 
I k ! l ,., ' ht'F, - R7 P. rr-i,, I .,ourt's failure to award attorney's fees to 
•hfe wii1 ""'· reversed in Christensen v. Christensen, 18 Utah 
!rl 31'.l, 42, F 2d '-'l4 (i!olbi 1, and Griffiths v. Griffiths, 3 Utah 2d 82, 
278 P. 2d 98 J ( 19:)) 1 - rne award of counsel fees to Mrs. Naylor by the 
Dislticl r:ourt was entirely appropriate. 
Due to Dr. Naylor's dissatisfaction with the District Court's 
rnodific11tion of his alimony and support obligations, Mrs. Naylor has now 
been burdened with thP additional costs of this appeal. This Court has 
frequently held that, in such circumstances, a further award is 
appropriate to cover the added costs necessitated by the dissatisfied 
party's appeal. For example, in Ehninger v. Ehninger, 569 P.2d 1104 
< i:tah 1977), the husband, disenchanted with the trial judge's award, 
appealeu with the usual contention that the property distribution was 
unfau and inequitable. The original decree was affirmed and the case 
r 0 mH 11ded to the trial court for the assessment of the additional 
atlurney's fees incurred by the wife as a result of the appeal: 
lnasinuch as the [wife] has been put to the 
necessity of defending this appeal, which we 
ha" e found to be without merit, it is our 
np1nwn thac she is justified in her request 
fo1 " further award of attorney's fees 
l ,, 1 he same effect is Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P. 2d 
I r r' I I' t ' 
13 
As a result of this A.pf''.081 \11.,. t·!11ylor hfls incurred substan-
tial additional expense. The conteolwns ra1c,Pd hy Dr. Naylor in this 
appeal are insubstantial and he should bear the cost of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The principal contention raised by Dr. Naylor is that, since 
the original alimony was for a specific number of years, the District 
Court lacked the jurisdiction to modify that award. The Legislature has 
clearly stated that the District Courts retain jurisdiction in all 
domestic relations matters to make appropriate modifications in the 
event that there is a significant change in the circumstances of the 
parties. f11is Court has consistently adhered to the principle that the 
alimony pr·>V!&JOns of a divorce decree may be modified, upon a showing 
of subst8ntial change of circumstance warranting that modification, 
regardless of the nature of the original decree and regardless of 
whether it was based upon a property settlement and stipulation. Thus, 
there is no merit to Dr. N aylor's principal contention. 
Dr. Naylor also contends that there was not a sufficient show-
ing of changed circumstances, claiming that his income has risen from 
$2,600 per month to only $3,170 per month. This contention simply 
ignores the evidence presented at the trial court and omits such 
important factors as to ren<ier it grossly mislear!ing. In reality, 
Dr. N aylor's net. after-tax incomto ot Ir, - 11m·· of the modification hear-
ing was in excess of $6, 000 per r.1or>t h and, rn Hddition to that amount. 
14 
,., rP•'P,,,_,rJ sut•st1<nt1al her1eflfs including the use of a modern automo-
n1IF and rwns1m1 anrl pre.fit-sharing contributions equaling nearly 25 
p;c"rent of t111o; gr-os" !w:ome>. On the other hand, Mrs. Naylor's income 
has i;hown no sign1f1c1Jnt increase. although substantial increases were 
antic1pa1Nl at the time of the original decree. Moreover, Dr. Naylor's 
son has now reached his teens and inflation has taken its toll, forcing 
rs. Naylor to borrow more than $13, 000 from her parents in order to 
meet current expenses. Under such circumstances, the modifications 
ordered by the trial court were not only justified, they were 
necessitated. 
The District Court awarded Mrs. Naylor $1,000 toward her 
counsel fees. That award was proper. since the unrefuted evidence 
adduced at the modification hearing demonstrated that she was without 
the financial wherewithal! to pay her counsel. Unfortunately, addi-
tional fees and costs have been incurred as a result of this appeal. 
Those fees shoulrl also be borne by Dr. Naylor and the award of addi-
tionlll fees should be ordered by this Court. In all other respects, 
the modification ordered by the District Court must be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ::t/!day of August, 1983. 
DART l STEGALL 
By 
By 
15 
day of August, 1983, I 
placed two copies of the fongo111g 1'EspoW1Pnt's Brief with The Runner 
Service to be delivered to Waller IL Ellett, attorney for plaintiff-
appellant, 5085 South Stale Street, Murray, Utah 84107. 
lh 
